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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit 
expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals 
who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the 
implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who
take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. 
Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a 
supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates. 
EXPERT OPINIONS AND TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: 
1. INTRODUCTION
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
Michael Graetz, Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde* 
July 1988 
(Revised November 1989) 
Despite recent attempts to simplify the U.S. Tax Code, 1 it has become increasingly difficult for
citizens to fulfill their legal obligations, and more and more taxpayers have turned to paid third 
parties to help them prepare their tax retums.2 About half of all individual income tax returns and an 
even greater proportion of complex returns are now filed with the assistance of a professional income 
tax preparer (IRS, 1989; Jackson and Milliron, 1987). 
The dramatic increase of paid third parties in the revenue collection process has begun to 
attract the attention of both the IRS and academic researchers. Scotchmer (1989a, 1989b) and Beck, 
Davis and Jung (1989) analyze theoretical models in which tax advisors reduce taxpayers' 
uncertainty about true taxable income. In Scotchmer's model the presence of tax advisors results in 
higher taxpayer welfare but lower compliance, and thus lower net revenue for the government. 
Beck, Davis and Jung describe a signaling model in which taxpayers have private information 
regarding their expected tax liabilities. In their model, the decision to consult a practitioner (in order 
to resolve residual uncertainty) conveys to the government additional information beyond that which 
would otherwise be conveyed by the individual's reporting behavior. The impact of practitioners on 
expected government revenue is ambiguous, however, since voluntary payments may either increase 
or decrease, while post-audit tax and penalty payments decrease with the use of practitioners. 
Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin (1988) analyze a nonstrategic model in which tax preparers can reduce 
the penalty rate faced by taxpayers who are discovered to be underreporting "ambiguous" income. 
In their model percentage noncompliance is greater for "unambiguous" income items on self­
prepared returns than professionally prepared returns, while the opposite relationship holds for 
ambiguous income items. Finally, Reinganum and Wilde (1988, 1989) analyze game-theoretic 
models which focus on the "seivice" aspects of tax practitioners, such as reducing the costs of retum 
preparation and providing an alternative to self-representation when a taxpayer is audited. In their 
basic model (Reinganum and Wilde, 1988), more income generally is reported when practitioners 
* Yale Law School, UrJversit-y of Iowa, and California Institute of Technology, respectively. Professor Graetz thanks the
National Science Foundation for research support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Professors Reinganum and Wilde (grant 
nos. SES-8903157 and SES-8902545). 
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, for example, increased significantly the proportion of taxpayers who use the standard 
deduction rather than itemizing deductions and eliminated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income. 
2. An overview of the tax preparer industry in the United States may be found in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989). 
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control the reporting decision than if taxpayers did not use a practitioner, and the tax agency devotes 
less enforcement effort to practitioner-filed returns than to taxpayer-filed returns; the opposite 
relationships generally hold if taxpayers and the practitioner jointly control the reporting decision. 3 
In Reinganum and Wilde (1989), which focuses on the case in which taxpayers control the reporting 
decision, a variety of outcomes are possible, depending on practitioner penalties and the efficiency 
gains from using practitioners. In the "policy relevant" case, the tax agency prefers that the taxpayer 
file his own return while the taxpayer prefers to use a practitioner. In this case, the use of a 
practitioner again implies less compliance compared to taxpayer-filed returns. 
Our analysis here builds on this wmk and our own earlier work (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 
1986) by incorporating the tax agency as a strategic agent into a framework in which tax experts can 
reduce the penalty rate faced by taxpayers who take risky positions on ambiguous return items. 4 In 
particular, we analyze a situation in which legal ambiguity exists regarding the legitimacy of a 
specific deduction. By paying a fee, a taxpayer can solicit an expert opinion that provides a form of 
insurance against imposition of certain penalties in the event of an adverse ruling by the tax agency 
on the legitimacy of the deduction should an audit occur; for example, in the presence of a 
supporting opinion from a qualified tax expert, the taxpayer will be shielded from fraud penalties or 
certain other penalties that might otherwise apply. 
By structuring the model in this manner we have captured one essential role played by tax 
practitioners in recent years. It has long been the case that an opinion letter from a tax attorney or 
accountant has served as a practical bar to the imposition of civil and criminal fraud penalties even 
though "advice of counsel" is not always a technical defense. In addition, professional advice 
concerning the use and nature of tax return disclosures of doubtful positions can serve to avoid 
certain penalties, for example, the penalty for "substantial understatements" of tax under § 6661 of
the Internal Revenue Code. Indeed, during the heyday of the tax shelter industry in the 1970s, an 
Assistant Attorney General characterized tax advisers as, in effect, selling "fraud insurance." 
In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit 
expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals 
who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the 
implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who 
take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. 5 
Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a 
supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates.6
3. Some empirical work related to the effects of paid third parties on compliance has also been done (e.g., Klepper and 
Nagin, 1987; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1989) although, as is often the case with empirical tax compliance research, the 
quality of the data limits significantly the usefulness of the results. 
4. This description of the function of tax advisors is similar to that found in Klepper and Nagin (1987), but the model we 
propose is unique in its incorporation of strategic elements. 
5. This may occur because the IRS is not able to observe whether such an opinion exists until they audit, although the IRS 
can know in advanced of audit whether or not the return was prepared by a paid professional preparer. 
6. Li..-r. itations on 1t1e degree of riskiness for which supporting opinions may be given are sometimes imposed by the law or
IRS administrative pronouncements (e.g.,§ 6661 of the Internal Revenue code or IRS Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. Part JO) or by 
professional standards of conduct (e.g., American Bar Association Formal Opinion 85-352, AI CPA, Statement of 
Responsibility of Tax Practice). 
3 
We first establish the existence of equilibria in which (1) some taxpayers take risky positions 
without supporting opinions, some take risky positions with supporting opinions, and some do not 
take risky positions at all, and (2) the tax agency audits all returns filed in which taxpayers take risky 
positions, whether or not a supporting opinion is present. In these equilibria, increases in the penalty 
on taxpayers for whom the risky position is disallowed in the absence of a supporting opinion 
increase the number of taxpayers who take risky positions with supporting opinions and decrease 
expected revenue. To the contrary, increases in the penalty on taxpayers for whom the risky position 
is disallowed in the presence of a supporting opinion decrease the number of taxpayers who take 
risky positions with supporting opinions and increase expected revenue. 
We further explore properties of the model using as an example the case in which taxpayers are 
evenly distributed between 0 and 1 with respect to the likelihood that the deduction would be 
disallowed in an audit. We show that the effects of increases in penalties on taxpayer behavior are 
stronger when some but not all taxpayers who take risky positions are audited. Increases in the tax 
rate can increase or decrease taxpayers' incentives to take risky positions but, in general, the less 
responsive are audit rates to increases in the tax rate, the more likely it is that increases in the tax rate 
will increase taxpayers' tendencies to take risky positions. 
When the tax agency is prohibited from conditioning audit rates on the presence of a 
supporting opinion, expected revenue generally rises (compared to the unconstrained case) when the 
tax rate is low and the penalty on taxpayers for whom the risky position is disallowed in the absence
of a supporting opinion is high relative to the tax rate. Expected revenue generally falls if either the 
tax rate is high or the penalty on unsupported risky positions is low relative to the tax rate. Since the
most realistic presumption is one of a high tax rate and a relatively low penalty rate, we conclude 
that a prohibition on conditioning audit rates on the presence of a supporting opinion generally 
decreases expected government revenue. 
Finally, we consider regulation of tax experts in the fonn of a limitation on the type of taxpayer 
for whom supporting opinions can be given. In particular, we assume that there is an upper bound 
on the likelihood that the deduction would be disallowed in an audit for which supporting opinions 
can be given. Such an upperbound may be set legislatively by penalties, administratively by rules of 
practice or through self-regulation by professional organizations. This upper bound captures, for 
example, mathematically the intention, but not the precise contours, of the ethical obligations of both 
the accounting and legal professions. (See, e.g., AI CPA, Statements of Responsibilities in Tax 
Practice; ABA, Fonnal Opinion 85-352). Stricter regulation in tenns of a reduction in this upper 
bound increases the range of equilibria in which tax experts are not used. However, over ranges in 
which auditing occurs and some taxpayers obtain expert opinions, stricter regulation increases 
expected revenue. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the general model and state
existence and comparative statics results for equilibria in which some taxpayers use tax experts and 
for equilibria in w!iich none do. Lq section 3 we considei in detail u.11.e exan1ple h1 wl1ich taxpayers
are distributed evenly between 0 and 1 with respect to the likelihood that the deduction would be 
disallowed in an audit. In section 4, using the example, we analyze audit constraints and regulation. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our results and some of their policy implications. 
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2. THEMODEL 
Our model builds directly on the game-theoretic approach introduced in Graetz, Reinganum 
and Wilde (1986) and further developed by Beck and Jung (1989a, 1989b). The reader is referred to 
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) for a detailed discussion of the basic framework. In contrast to
that paper, however, we herein specifically take the case of the legitimacy of a subtraction-to-income 
item, a deduction, instead of the underreporting of income. The primary innovation in this paper is 
the introduction of tax experts into a strategic model of tax compliance. 
We consider the following stylized situation. A taxpayer has the option of claiming a 
particular deduction. If the deduction is taken and the taxpayer is audited, there is some chance that 
the tax agency will disallow the deduction and require the taxpayer to pay the tax due plus a penalty. 
The taxpayer, however, can pay a tax expert for a supporting opinion, in which case the penalty 
associated with an adverse judgement is reduced. We use the following notation: 
t = the tax savings associated with taking the deduction, 
k = the cost of a supporting opinion, 
f N = the penalty if the deduction is disallowed and rw supporting opinion is present, 
f 0 = the penalty if the deduction is disallowed and a supporting opinion is present,
it = the probability that the deduction would be disallowed in an audit, and
c = the cost of an audit. 
2A. TAX EXPERTS 
Tax experts in this model are relatively passive; they simply provide supporting opinions for a 
fee. 
Assumption 1: The cost of providing a supporting opinion is constant at k and is independent of the 
probability that the deduction would be disallowed in an audit 
Assumption 2: There is no upper bound on the probability that the deduction would be disallowed in 
an audit, it, for which supporting opinions may be rendered. 
Both of these assumptions are relatively strong, but it is the assumption that a supporting 
opinion can be obtained regardless of the risk associated with the position which is the most 
unrealistic. However, in section 4B we consider the implications of introducing an upper bound on 
the degree of riskiness for which supporting opinions may be rendered, and will interpret reductions 
in this upper bound in tenns of the regulation of tax experts. As noted in the introduction, in tenns 
of policy, such limits may be set by legislation, by administrative rules, or by tax experts themselves. 
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2B. TAXPAYERS 
Taxpayers act strategically in deciding whether to take the deduction and whether to purchase a 
supporting opinion if they do take the deduction. In this subsection we characterize taxpayer 
behavior, taking tax agency behavior (i.e., audit rates) as given. 
Assumption 3: Taxpayers vary according to the probability that the deduction would be disallowed 
in an audit, which we refer to as their "exposure." The cumulative distribution of exposures is given 
by F (n) with density f (n), the latter which we take for expositional convenience to be strictly 
positive for all n E [0,1]. 
Assumption 4: A taxpayer's exposure is private information; in particular, the tax agency is unable
directly to observe it. The tax agency can, however, condition its audit policy on whether the 
taxpayer takes the deduction, and whether a supporting opinion is present. 
Given Assumption 4, we introduce the following notation: 
p = the probability of audit given the deduction is not taken, 
Po = the probability of audit given the deduction is taken with a supporting opinion, and 
PN = the probability of audit given the deduction is taken without a supporting opinion.
Asslimption .5: Taxpayers are risk neutral and minimize the sum of taxes plus costs of supporting
opinions plus expected penalties; their total tax-related payments. 
Define: 
T = the tax-related payment when the deduction is not taken (independent of taxpayer
exposure), 
To (n) = the tax-related payment when the deduction is taken by a taxpayer with exposure n, with a 
supporting opinion, and 
TN (n) = the tax-related payment when the deduction is taken by a taxpayer with exposure n, 
without a supporting opinion. 
Remark J: Given Assumptions 1-5, 
(a) T = t, 
(b) To (1t) = po n(t+fo)+k ,
(c) TN(1t) = PN1t(t + fN). 
For some combinations of the tax rate, penalties, audit rates, and the cost of a supporting 
opinion, all taxpayers prefer to take the deduction without a supporting opinion. For other 
combinations, some of these taxpayers prefer to take the deduction with a supporting opinion, and 
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for yet other combination some of them prefer not to take the deduction at all. Finally, for still other 
combinations all three options are preferred by some taxpayers. The next results uses Remark 1 to 
characterize these cases. 
Lemma 1: Given Assumptions 1-5, for arbitrary values of p0 and PN, the following four choice 
configurations are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. 
(a) If PN (t + f N)::;; min {t ,p0 (t + f 0 )  + k} then taxpayers of all exposures find it optimal to take 
the deduction without a supporting opinion. 
(b) If Po (t + f 0 )  + k <min {t •PN (t + f N )}, then taxpayers of all exposures find it optimal to take
the deduction. Furthermore, 
1t::;; kl[pN (t + f N) -Po (t + f 0 )] implies that no supporting opinion is optimal, and 
1t > k /[pN (t + f N) -Po (t + f 0)] implies that a supporting opinion is optimal.7
(c) If p0 (t + f 0 )t 2: (t - k)pN(t + fN) and t < PN(t + f N) then no taxpayer types find it optimal to 
solicit an opinion. Furthermore, 
1t ::;; t /pN (t + f N) implies that taking the deduction without a supporting opinion is 
optimal, and 
1t > t lpN (t + f N) implies that not taking the deduction at all is optimal. 8
(d) If pN(t + f N)k < t [pN(t+ fN)-p0(t + f 0 )] and t -k <p0 (t + f o) then all three choice
options are potentially optimal. In particular, 
1t::;; kl[pN(t + f N) -p0 (t + f 0)] implies that taking the deduction with no supporting 
opinion is optimal, 
k l[pN (t + f N) -Po (t + f 0 )] < 1t < (t - k )/po (t + f 0 )  implies that taking the deduction 
with a supporting opinion is optimal, and 
1t 2: (t - k )!p0 (t + f 0 )  implies that not taking the deduction is optimal.9
Inspection of Lemma 1 reveals that taxpayers' optimal decisions depend on their exposure in a 
very simple way. In particular, taxpayers with low exposures always take the deduction without a 
supporting opinion, taxpayers with higher exposures may take the deduction with a supporting 
opinion, and taxpayers with even higher exposures may not take the deduction at all. Thus, we can 
without loss of generality restrict the taxpayers' strategy to a pair, (1ti.it2), with the following
properties. 
7. If 7t = klfpN(t + fN )- po (t + f 0 )] then the taxpayer is indifferent between soliciting and not soliciting a supporting 
opinion. We adopt the convention in this case that indifference is resolved in favor of not soliciting a supporting opinion. 
8. If 7t = tlpN(t + PN) then the taxpayer is indifferent between taking the deduction without a supporting opinion and not 
taking the deduction. We adopt the convention in this case that i..Tldifference is resolved in favor of taYJ.."lg the deduction with 
a supporting opinion. 
9. In this case we resolve indifference in favor of not soliciting opinions or not taking the deduction. 
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Definition 1: A strategy for the taxpayer is given by a pair (7t1>7tz) with n1:::; 7tz such that 
(a) the deduction is taken without a supporting opinion if 7t:::; n1. 
(b) the deduction is taken with a supporting opinion if n1 < 7t < 7tz 
(c) no deduction is taken if 7t <': n2, 10
Figure 1 illustrates the four choice configurations of Lemma 1 in terms of Definition 1 .
choice configuration taxpayer choices by type 
a. all take deduction without opinion 
b. deduction with or without opinion 
c. deduction without opinion or no deduction 
d. all three options possible 
I 
0 N 
< 
I 
l·-----l--l 
0 N 1t1 0 I 
1------ -- �--- 1 
O N 1ti""1!1. • 1 
1---- -1-- -- ->--l 
O N 1t1 0 'lt1 •1 
Figure 1: Choice configurations by taxpayer exposure 
N = deduction without supporting opinion 
0 = deduction with supporting opinion 
ti> = no deduction 
Since we assume taxpayers minimize their tax related payments, it is necessary to describe an 
optimal strategy pair for any taxpayer given audit strategy on the part of the tax agency. We do this 
next. Since the optimal taxpayer strategy takes the strategy of the tax agency as given, it is call a 
"best response." 
Definition 2: A best response for the taxpayer is a strategy pair (7t1>7tz) the elements of which
minimize the taxpayer's tax-related payments. 
Remark 2: It follows directly from Lemma 1 that a best response for the taxpayer takes the 
following form. 
(a) If Po (t + f 0 )t <': (t - k )PN (t + f N) and t < PN (t + f N) then
7t1 = t /pN (t + f N) = 1tz. 
(b) Otherwise 
10. Here we again resolve indifference in favor of not soliciting opinic:ns or r>..ot taY..i.."lg tI1e deduction at all when n:1 < T"i..z 
(see footnote 9). If 1t1 = n2 we also assume the taxpayer of exposure 1t = n1 talces the deduction without a supporting opinion 
as opposed to not talcing the deduction at all (see footnote 8). 
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and 
1t2 = (t - k)lpo (t + f o). 
This completes the description of taxpayer behavior, taking audit rates as given. We next 
describe tax agency behavior, leading up to a definition of a best response for the tax agency, taking 
taxpayer behavior as given. We then combine these best response definitions in section 2D to define 
an equilibrium for the game. 
2C. THE TAX AGENCY 
Our basic specification of the tax agency follows closely that of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986). Initially we allow the tax agency to condition its audit policy on whether taxpayers who ta1ce
the deduction obtain a supporting opinion. Later, in section 4A, we analyze the case in which the tax 
agency is prohibited from conditioning its audit policy on whether a supporting opinion is present 
(i.e., it must set PN =Po). In either case, we assume the tax agency acts strategically in setting audit 
rates. 
Assumption 6: The tax agency is risk neutral and maximizes expected revenue (including penalties)
net of audii costs. Audit costs are positive. 
Assumption 7: The tax agency can set differential audit rates depending on whether the deduction is
ta1cen, and if it is, on whether a supporting opinion is present. 
Define: 
R = expected revenue from a taxpayer who does not ta1ce the deduction, 
R0 = expected revenue from a taxpayer who ta1ces the deduction with a supporting opinion, and 
RN = expected revenue from a taxpayer who ta1ces the deduction without a supporting opinion. 
The tax agency does not know the exposures of individual taxpayers but it does know how 
exposures are distributed over the population of taxpayers; that is, it knows F (it). Because of this,
and because the tax agency moves second, it can ma1ce inferences about the taxpayer's exposure for
any return filed by observing whether a supporting opinion was obtained. However, it must behave 
optimally in light of that infonnation.11
We next consider expected revenue for each of the four choice configurations given in Lemma 
1 and displayed in Figure 1. Regardless of the choice configuration, if the tax agency sees a return
with no deduction it expects revenue of t -pc, the tax due minus expected audit costs, since no
11. It must play a so-called "subgame perfect strategy" (Selten, 1975). Tiris rules out precommitment on the part of the tax 
agency to particular audit strategies. See Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) for an extensive discussion of this approach. 
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additional tax or penalty revenue can result from an audit If it sees a return that takes the deduction 
without a supporting opinion, it expects no revenue unless it audits the return, in which case it 
expects to receive the additional tax and penalty associated with a judgement in favor of the tax 
agency, times the average likelihood of such a judgement given the exposure of taxpayers who 
choose to take the deduction without a supporting opinion, minus the cost of an audit If the tax 
agency sees a return that takes the deduction with a supporting opinion, it forms a similar 
expectation of revenue, except in those cases in which it is not part of any taxpayer strategy to 
choose to take the deduction with a supporting opinion. In these cases the tax agency forms 
conjectures over what exposures would lead a taxpayer to choose that option even though it doesn't 
expect them to do so. These conjectures we denote by rr. and Ile respectively, for choice 
configurations a and c in Lemma l. rz
These observations are formalized in the next remarlc. 
Remark 3: Given Assumptions 1-6, in all cases R = t -pc . Otherwise, for arbitrary values of :n:r 
and 7tz such that :n:r :S: :n:2: 
(a) IfpN(t +IN):>: min {t ,po (t +I 0) +k} then 
(i) Ro =po [(t + lo )E (:n:l:n:e IT.)-c], and 
(ii) RN =pN[(t +IN)E (:n:) - c], 
where E( ·)is the expectation operator and Ila c [0,l]is an arbitrary set of conjectures. 
(b) ifpo (t +Io )+ k <min {t ,pN(t +IN)} then
(i) Ro =po [(t+lo ) E (:n:l:n:r < :n::S:l) - c],and 
(ii) RN =pN[(t + IN)E (:n:l:n::S::n:r) - c]. 
(c) If Po (t +I o )t?: (t -k)pN(t +IN) and t <pN(t +IN), then 
(i) Ro =Po [(t +I o ) E  (:n:l:n: E Ile)- c], and 
(ii) RN =pN[(t +IN)E (:n:l:n::S::n:r) - c], 
where Ile c [0, l] is an arbitrary set of conjectures. 
(d) IfpN(t + IN)k < tfpN(t +IN )-po (t +Io)] and t -k <po (t +I 0), then 
(i) Ro =po [(t +I o)E (:n:l:n:r < :n: <  :n:z) - c], and
(ii) RN =pN[(t +IN)E (:n:l:n::S::n:1) - c] .  
It is immediate from Remark 3 that the tax agency will never audit taxpayers that d o  not take 
the deduction (i.e .,p = 0 is always part of an optimal strategy for the tax agency). We can 
therefore, without loss of generality, describe strategies for the tax agency in terms of just PN and Po . 
12. In section 3 we characteri7.e completely Bll possible equi!ibriu.rn. co:nfiguratior1s v1hen F' is UI·..iform on [0,1]. In that case 
we restrict attention to conjectures which are "universally divine" (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Universal divinity essentially
restricts conjectures to the exposure of the taxpayer with the most to gain by deviating to the particular strategy. 
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Definition 3: A strategy for the tax agency is a pair of audit probabilities (pN ,p0 ).
Since we assume that the tax agency maximizes expected revenue net of audit costs, it is 
necessary to describe an optimal strategy pair for the tax agency given any reporting strategy on the
part of taxpayers. This optimal strategy is again referred to as a best response since it takes taxpayer 
strategies as given. 
Definition 4: A best response for the tax agency is a strategy pair (pN ,p0 ), the elements of which
maximize RN and R0 , respectively.
Inspection of Remark 3, which characterizes expected revenue for the tax agency in each of the 
choice configurations illustrated in Figure 1, reveals that expected revenue from a taxpayer who 
takes the deduction with a supporting opinion is always equal to the probability of auditing such a 
taxpayer times a term which depends only on the tax rate, the fine for disallowed deductions when a 
supporting opinion is present, tax agency expectations about exposures, and audit costs. In other 
words, it is always equal to the probability of audit times a term which does not depend on the 
probability of audit. If the term is positive, then an increase in the audit rate always increases 
expected revenue, if the term is zero then expected revenue is always zero, and if the term is negative
then an increase in the audit rate always decreases expected revenue. Thus the optimal audit rate for 
taxpayers who take the deduction with a supporting opinion will be l, any value between 0 and l, or
0 depending on whether the relevant term in Remark 2 is positive, zero, or negative. Similarly, it is 
clear that a best response for the tax agency is to audit all returns filed with the deduction but no 
supporting opinion whenever the relevant term which multiplies PN in Remark 2 is positive, to audit
any fraction of such returns whenever it is zero, and to audit none whenever it is negative. These 
observations are summarized formally as follows. 
Lemma 2: Denote the term which multiplies p0 in each of the expressions for Ro in Remark 3 by 
r0; , and the term which multiplies PN in each of the expressions for RN in Remark 3 by rNi, where
i E {a ,b ,c ,d}. Then a best response for the tax agency is
=0 
E [0,1] as 
=1  
for allj E {O,N}andi E {a,b ,c ,d}. 
1 1
2D. EQUILIBRIUM: EXISTENCE AND GENERAL PROPERTIES 
We now define an equilibrium and state some general results. Since many equilibria can 
involve "corner values" for audit probabilities or critical taxpayer exposures (zeros or ones for PN. 
p0 , re1, or ltz), we will not fully characterize all possible equilibria for the general case. This will be 
done for a specific example in section 3 below. 
Definition 5: An equilibrium is a set of strategy pairs {(pif,pJ),(re1*,re{)} which are best responses 
to each other. 
In terms of the existence of equilibria in the general case, we are most interested in those for 
which some taxpayer types find it optimal to take the deduction with a supporting opinion. It turns 
out that if f N -f 0 > k, then there always exists an equilibrium in which tax experts are actually 
used. That f N -f 0 > k is a very weak condition; it merely requires that the savings from taking the 
deduction with a supporting opinion compared to taking it without a supporting opinion exceeds the 
cost of soliciting the supporting opinion. If this were not the case, clearly no taxpayers would solicit 
a supporting opinion. 
Proposition 1: Let f N and f 0 be such that f N -f 0 > k .  Then given Assumptions 1-6, there exists 
T:(j NJ 0 )  such that an equilibrium with 0 < re1* < 1t{ < 1 and pif = 1 = pJ exists for all
t > T:(j NJ o ). In this equilibrium re{' = k l(f N -f 0 )  and re{ = (t - k )l(t + f 0 ).13 
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, the tax agency audits all returns thattake the deduction and 
no returns that do not.14 A change in penalties, if it is small enough, will thus have no effect on audit 
rates. But a change in penalties can affect which taxpayers take the deduction and which solicit 
supporting opinions. 
Corollary 1: Suppose f N -f 0 > k and t > 'r:(j NJ 0 ). Then in the equilibrium of Proposition 1 ,
iJre{'ldf N < 0 = dre{ldf N and dre{'ldf o > 0 > dre2*1df o . 
An increase in the penalty for disallowed deductions in the absence of a supporting opinion has 
no effect on who takes the deduction, but of those taxpayers who do, it causes more of them to solicit 
a supporting opinion.15 An increase in the penalty for disallowed deductions in the presence of a 
supporting opinion causes fewer taxpayers to take the deduction, and of those who do, it causes 
fewer to solicit a supporting opinion. Thus, changes in the two kinds of penalties in this model have 
quite different effects; an increase in the penalty for disallowed deductions in the absence of a 
supporting opinion increases the range of taxpayers who use a tax expert and an increase in the 
penalty for disallowed deductions in the presence of a supporting opinion decreases it. Even in the 
13. Assumption 7, that the tax agency can setpN ¢p0, is not needed here since we consider only equilibria in which 
PN=I=po. 
14. This need not always be the case-for exatnple, in Section 3 where we assume F is u...Uform on [0,1], we describe fut 
open set of parameter values for which 0 < n1* < 1C.f < l, 0 < p-J < 1 and 0 < p<f < 1 .
15. This, for example, may be one of the consequences of the rules for imposition of the 25 percent penalty o n  substantial 
understatements of tax under § 6661 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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absence of an equilibrium adjustment in audit rates, one might therefore expect that increases in 
some penalties may potentially reduce average expected revenue. Indeed, denoting average expected 
revenue by ER , we have the following result. 
Corollary2: SupposefN-fo >k andt >'t(fNJ0). Then in the equilibrium of Proposition 1, 
d ER/dfN <0 and(JER/dfo >0 . 
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, increases in the penalty for disallowed deductions when no
supporting opinion is present actually decrease expected revenue while, as one might have predicted, 
increases in the penalty for disallowed deductions when a supporting opinion is present increase 
expected revenue. 
Finally, we note in passing that in the equilibrium of Proposition 1, increases in audit costs 
have no effect on taxpayer behavior (because audit rates are fixed at 1), and increases in the cost of 
soliciting a supporting opinion both decrease the range of taxpayers who take the deduction, and of 
those who still do take the deduction, decrease the range who solicit a supporting opinion. 
It is also possible to show that under relatively weak conditions there exist equilibria in which 
no taxpayers solicit expert opinions, but some still take the deduction and auditing is nontrivial. 
Proposition 2: Suppose c <min {(t + f o)t/(t + fN), (t + f N)E(rtl rt$ t/(t + fN))} and
k > (f N -f 0 )t l(t + f N ). Then there exists a universally divine equilibrium with 0 < rti" = rtf < 1
and p/f = 1 = p(f. In this equilibrium rt{ = t /(t + f N) = 1tf .16
The conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which some but not all taxpayers take the 
deduction but none solicit a supporting opinion are quite natural. To rule out use of tax experts it 
suffices that the cost of using them is high (k is large) or the benefits of using them low (f N -f 0 is 
small). At the same time it must be that the cost of auditing is low enough to prevent all taxpayers 
from taking the deduction (c is small).17
3. THE UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF EXPOSURES
One of the important aspects of using game-theoretic techniques to analyze tax compliance is 
that it allows audit rates to be endogenous. We would therefore like to investigate comparative 
statics similar to those given in Corollaries 1 and 2 for equilibria in which one or both audit rates are 
less than I. This is difficult to do in the general case so we now characterize fully all equilibria for a 
specific distribution of taxpayer exposures, the uniform.18 This also will allow us to consider the
16. See footnote 10 for a discussion of universal divinity. 
17. Indeed, the assumption here is that audit costs to taxpayers are zero except for the costs of penalties where imposed. As 
audit costs to taxpayers increase, fewer taxpayers should take the deduction (since only those taxpayers who take the 
de..duction will be subject to t.liese costs), and thus ti.1i.e requiren1ent that c be small is weakened. 
18. In the uniform distribution, exposure levels are evenly distributed between 0 and 1. This distribution of exposures is
both computationally convenient and "neutral" in the sense that it puts equal weight on all exposures, and thus introduces no 
particular biases into the analysis. 
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effects of prohibiting the tax agency from conditioning its audit policy on whether a supporting 
opinion is present (i.e., constraining it to setpN =p0), and the effects of regulation of tax experts in 
the form of an upper bound on the set of taxpayer exposures for which a supporting opinion can be 
-
-
given (say, it, where 0 < 1t < 1). These latter issues we take up in section 4 below. 
Assumptions: F(it) = itfor all ite (0,1]. 
Assumption 9: c > k + f o .
Assumption 9, that the cost of an audit is greater than the cost of a supporting opinion plus the 
penalty on disallowed deductions with a supporting opinion, is made for expositional and 
diagrammatic convenience only. It allows us to solve explicitly for equilibrium values of 1tN, 1to, 
PN and Po in all cases, and maximizes the likelihood that equilibria in which tax experts are used 
will exist. These, of course, are the equilibria in which we are most interested. 
Table 1 gives equilibrium values for 1tN, 1to, PN, and p0 for each of 8 distinct equilibrium 
types, labeled E 1-E 8. It also lists the effective constraints that characterize the set of parameters
{t JNJ 0 ,c ,k} for which each equilibrium type exists.19 Figure 2 illustrates the range of values oft
and/ N for which each equilibrium type exists given/ 0 = 0, k = 3, and c = 5. As the figure clearly
indicates, the eight equilibrium types are exhaustive and mutually exclusive when f 0 = 0 . Of
particularinterestto us, though, are typeE I andE2 equilibria whenf0 > 0. This is because in type
E 1 equilibria no endogenous variables (1tN, it0 , PN and p0 ) are equal to 0 or I. Thus the full range 
of interactions are possible whenever there is a change in an exogenous parameter. In type E 2 
equilibria, the presence of a supporting opinion automatically triggers an audit, yet taxpayers still 
use tax experts. Indeed, equilibria types E 1-E 4 are all of particular interest in so far as they involve 
some taxpayers using tax experts. 
Proposition 3: Given Assumptions 1-9, there exist nontrivial but disjoint sets of parameter values
for which equilibria of type EI and E 2  exist, respectively. 
Table 2 gives comparative statics results for type E 1 equilibria. 
19. We shall not provide a case-by-case proof of the conditicr1s specified i..--i Table 1. The logic generally follows i.hat of 
Propositions 1 and 2. A copy of the proofs that these are the relevant constrai nts and that no other equilibrium types are 
possible is available from the authors on request. 
Equilibrium Type 
E l 
EZ 
E3 
E4 
ES 
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Table 1: Equilibrium Types, Optimal Strategies and Effective Constraints 
WhenF is Uniform on [0,lJ and k + f 0 <c. 
Optimal Strategies 
1t*-� 
l - t + fN 
Effective Constraints 
la. t <fN-2fo 
(t -k)(t +Jo)+ klfN -Jo) 
pi/'= le. (t-k)(t+JN)<ZclfN-Jo) ZclfN-Jo) 
(t -k)(t +JN) pJ = ---�­ZclfN -Jo) 
t-k nf=-­t +fo 
p,/' 
Zc(t +Jo)+k(t +JN) 
2c(t+JN) 
k p,/'=­Zc 
piJ'=O 
t-k 
rrJ=--l +fo 
p,/' = I 
p(j=l 
1t* - ---1£_ _1t*1 I+ IN - 2 
p,/' = _t_ Zc 
pJ'=l 
note: la and lb =::>pJ > 0. la and le =::>pJ < 1.
Za. (t-k)(t+JN)�Zc<JN-Jo) 
2b. Zc(t +Jo)<(t-k)(t +JN) 
note: 2a and 2b :::::> 1tf < 1 
3a. (t + JN)(t+ Jo)SZclfN -Jo) 
3b. k5.t 
3c. 2c<t+fN 
note: k <c :::::> pJ < 1. 
4a. k(t +JN)�ZclfN-Jo) 
4b. k« +Jo)+ (t -k)<JN -Jo)� ZclfN -Jo) 
4c. kt <(t-k)JN-tfo 
note: 4c :::::> 1ti" > 0 
5a. t<2c
Sb. 2c <t+fN 
5d. (t-k)(t+JN)SZc(t+Jo)
Reason for Constraint 
1tf < 1
po*< 1 
pJ=1 
Po*=O 
1t[ < 1tf 
p,/' = I 
pJ'= 1 
Po*= 1 
no expert opinions 
Equilibrium Type 
E6 
E? 
ES 
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Table 1: Equilibrium Types, Optimal Strategies and Effective Constraints 
When F is Uniform on [0,1] and k + f 0 < c. (Cont.) 
Optimal Strategies 
n*--1--n* 1 
- l + fN - 2 
pJ= 1 
pJ=..!_ 2c 
pJ=O 
pJ=O 
pJ=O 
Effective Constraints 
6a.t;::2c 
6b. (J+fo)t�c(t+fN) 
6c. 1(1 +fo)�(t-k)(I +fN) 
7a. 2c<t+fN 
1b.t<2c 
?c. l �fN-2fo 
7d. k �I 
8a. t+fNS2c 
8b.t+f0S2c 
Reason for Constraint 
pff = 1 
no expert opinions 
rri* < 1 
pj=O 
no expert opinions 
pJ=O 
pJ=O 
0 
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E7 E3 E1 E2 
ES 
E6 
k c 
Figure 2: Equilibria when fo = 0, k = 3, c = 5, and Fis uniform o n  [O, 1].
Equilibrium types E1 • E4 involve the use of tax experts, ES • ES do not. 
In Equilibrium type ES there is no auditing and all taxpayers take the 
deduction without a supporting opinion. 
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Table 2: Signs of Effects of Changes in Parameters on Equilibrium 
Strategies: Type E I  Equilibrium; F Uniform on (0,1], k + f 0 < c .  
parameter 
strategy variable IN fa c k t 
it{ 0 + 0 
1tf + + 0 
Pit + + + 
pJ + + 
1tf 
-
iti* + + 0 
In the equilibria of Proposition 3 in which 0 < it1* < itf < 1, 0 <pit < 1, and 0 < p0* < 1 (type 
E I equilibria), increases in the penalty for disallowed deduction in the absence of a supporting 
opinion decrease the range of taxpayer types who take the deduction without a supporting opinion 
and increase the range who take it with a supporting opinion. The increase in the range of taxpayers 
who take the deduction wiih a supporting opinion comes at the expense of both taxpayers who take
the deduction without a supporting opinion and taxpayers who do not take the deduction at all. The 
reason why some taxpayers shift from not taking the deduction to taking it with a supporting opinion 
when the penalty for disallowed deductions in the absence of a supporting opinion increases, is that 
the latter causes the audit rate on taxpayers who take the deduction with a supporting opinion to fall. 
The audit rate falls, in tum, because the average exposure of a taxpayer who takes the deduction with 
a supporting opinion falls when the penalty for disallowed deduction in the absence of a supporting 
opinion increases. 20 
On the other hand, increases in the penalty on disallowed deductions in the presence of a 
supporting opinion have no effect on the range of taxpayers who take the deduction without a 
supporting opinion and decrease the range who take it with a supporting opinion, the latter solely at 
the expense of taxpayers who do not take the deduction at all. 21 
Increases in the cost of an audit increase the range of taxpayer types who take the deduction, 
with and without a supporting opinion, and decrease audit rates for both types of return. Increases in 
the cost of a supporting opinion have no effect on equilibrium taxpayer behavior at all due to 
balancing increases in pit and decreases inpJ. Finally, increases in the tax rate decrease the range 
of taxpayer types who take the deduction, with and without a supporting opinion, and increase audit 
rates for both types of return. In other words, for equilibria in which some taxpayers do not take the 
20. Compare, for example, this result to Corollary 1 where ptf = 1 = p0*.
21. Again, compare this result to Corollary I. 
18 
deduction, some take it with a supporting opinion, and some take it without a supporting opinion, 
and auditing is stochastic, with respect to those taxpayers who do take the deduction, increases in the 
tax rate decrease taxpayers' tendencies to take risky positions on ambiguous deductions.22
One troublesome feature of Proposition 3 is that existence of Type E 1 equilibria requires 
f N - 2f 0 > t (see Table 1, constraint la). Even if f 0 = 0 this condition is strong. Table 3 gives
comparative statics results for type E2 equilibria, in which 0 <it{'< 1tf < 1 and 0 <pi!f <: 1 = pJ' . 
Given Assumptions 1-9, this type of equilibrium can be shown to exist over a range of values offN 
less than t .  
Table 3: Signs of Effects of Changes in Parameters on Equilibrium 
Strategies: Type E2 equilibria; F Uniform on [0,l], k = f 0 < c .  
parameter 
strategy variable IN fo c k t 
itf 0 + 0 
itf 0 0 + 
Pff + + + 
Pd' 0 0 0 0 0 
it2* - iti* + + 
Comparative statics for type E2 equilibria are identical to type E 1 equilibria for it{' and pi!f. 
And in type E 2  equilibtiapd' = 1 by definition; i.e., all taxpayers who take the deduction with a 
supporting opinion are audited. Thus the significant differences between the comparative statics of 
type E 1 and type E 2 equilibria are all with respect to itf. In particular, in type E 2 equilibria, 
increases in the cost of a supporting opinion decrease itf, and increases in the tax rate increase it. 
Thus, increases in the tax rate can increase taxpayers' tendencies to take risky positions on 
ambiguous deductions, depending on the type of equilibrium. In general, the less responsive are 
audit rates to increases in tax rates, the more likely that increases in the tax rate will increase 
taxpayers' tendencies to take risky positions. 
Finally, we note from Table 1 that there is no particular relationship between audit rates across 
equilibrium types. In type E 2 equilibria pi!f < p0* by definition, in type E 3 equilibria pi!f >pd' by 
definition, and in type E 4 equilibria pi!f =Pd'. In all of these equilibrium types some taxpayers 
22. 1hls result is similar to the finding in Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) that increases in the tax rate increase 
compliance. To the extent that audit rates do not respond to increases in the tax rate, the result may fail to hold in either 
context. 
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actually solicit expert opinions. 
4. ADDITIONAL ISSUES: AUDIT CONSTRAINTS AND REGULATION
In this section, working in the context of the uniform distribution example presented in Section 
3, we explore two policy-related issues. In subsection 4A we consider the effects of prohibiting the 
tax agency from conditioning its audit policy on whether a supporting opinion is solicited and in 
subsection 4B we consider the effects of the regulation of tax experts by setting an upper bound on 
the exposure for which supporting opinions can be given. 
4A. AUDIT CONSTRAINTS 
In this subsection we replace Assumption 7, that the tax agency can set differential audit rates, 
with the following. 
Assumption 10: The tax agency must set PN = p0 . 
We denote the constrained audit rate by Pc. Table 4 gives equilibrium values for rcN, no and Pc for 
each of 5 distinct equilibrium types, three of which are present in the unconstrained case (E 4, E 6, 
and E 8-see Table 1), and two of which are new (E9andE10).23 Like Table 1, Table 4 also lists 
tt1e effective constraints that characterize the set of parameters {t JN J 0 ,c ,k} for which each
equilibrium type exists. These equilibrium types are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This is true 
in general but can also be seen in Figure 3, which illustrates the case off 0 = 0, k = 3 and c = 5. 
We are primarily interested in analyzing the revenue effects of replacing Assumption 7 with 
Assumption 10, i.e., constraining the tax agency to set PN = p0 . To do this we must be able to link 
equilibrium types before and after the regime switch. It turns out that when f 0 = 0 and 2k > c, the 
qualitative configuration of the equilibrium types illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 are "generic," and we 
can readily link the various equilibrium types. 
Proposition 4: Given Assumptions 1-6 and Assumptions 8-9, if f 0 = 0 and 2k > c,  then expected
revenue with constrained audits (Assumption 10) can be greater than, equal to, or less than expected 
revenue with unconstrained audits (Assumption 7). In particular, 
23. In fact, the equilibriwn type labeledE 10 in Table4 actually is very similar to equilibriwn type E7 in Table 1. The 
difference is that the tax agency is constrained to set pJ;;; pif in the former case so sequential rationality is not an issue­
the tax agency never expects to see a re tum talcing the deduction with a supporting opinion so given that it cannot set Po 
independently of PN, it sets Pc* according to RN only. If it sees a return talcing the deduction with a supporting opinion it
must audit it with probability Pc*. Thus cor1strai.Tlt 10c is different than constraint 7d, both of wl1ich sten1 from ihe
requirement that taxpayers must not want to take the deduction with a supporting opinion. Equilibrium types E 6 and E 8 
each have one less constraint in the constrained case compared to the unconstrained case for similar reasons. 
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Table 4: Equilibrium Types, Optimal Strategies and Effective Constraints 
When F is Unifonn on [0,1], k + f 0 < c .and PN =Po by constraint 
Equilibrium Type Optimal Strategies Effective Constra ints*' 
E4 
E6 
E8 
E9 
EIO 
k 
Jtl 
� 
�l�N-
'
_
'-
170-
Pc*= 1 
Pc * =0 
..,. * - 2ck(t
- k) 
.. , - k2(t +IN)+ ifN -10)t(t - 2k) 
4c. kt <(t -k)IN - tlo 
4d. k2(t +lo)�(t - k)(fN-lo)�c-t +k) 
6a. t�2c 
6c. t (t +lo)�(t-k)(t +IN) 
8a. t+fNS2c 
9a. kt <(t -k)IN-tfo 
. 2c (/N-fo)(t - k)' Jtf �  2 9b. k2(t+fo)<(t -k)(/N -lo)(2c-t+k) (t +I o)[k (t + fN)+(fN -I o)t(t -2k)] 
k2(t +IN)+(/N-lo)t(t - 2k) 
p * -
-
-
---���-
-
-
" 2c(/N -lo)(t -k) 
p *=_!_ " 2c 
note: 9a :::::) nt > 0 
lOa. 2c <t + fN 
10b. t <2c 
IOc. t (t +f0)�(2c-t)(t +IN) 
* Constraint labels match Table 1 whenever they are the same. 
Reason for Constraint 
nt <Tri*
Pc *= 1 
no expert opinions 
Pc*=O 
Pc *< 1 
Pc *< 1 
no expert opinions 
0 
2 1  
E10 E9 E4 
EB 
ES 
'"--�������������>--��������������� t 
Figure 3: Equilibria when fo= 0, k = 3, c = 5, F is uniform on [O, 1 ]  and PN = Po 
by assumption. Equilibrium types E4 and E9 involve the use of tax 
experts; ES, EB and E1 O do not. 
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(a) For initial type E 3 equilibria, expected revenue always increases under the regime switch, 
(b) For initial type E 1 equilibria, expected revenue increases, stays the same, or decreases under 
the regime switch as t is less than, equal to, or greater than 2k. 
(c) For initial type E 2 equilibria, expected revenue always decreases under the regime switch; and 
(d) For initial type E 4 equilibria, expected revenue is constant under the regime switch. 
Figure 4 shows the regions where expected revenue increases, decreases or stays the same after 
audits are constrained for those equilibria in which tax experts are used in the unconstrained case. 
The reason why expected revenue does not always fall is that the constraint that PN = p0 can allow a 
form of precommitment. 1n some cases, the ability to precommit in this form can allow the tax 
agency actually to increase its expected revenue.24 
Corollary 3: Under the conditions of Proposition 4, compared to unconstrained equilibria in which 
some taxpayers solicit supporting opinions, expected revenue generally will rise when the tax agency 
is constrained not to base its audit policy on whether a supporting opinion is present if the tax rate is 
low (t < 2c) and the penalty rate for disallowed deductions in the absence of a supporting opinion is 
high relative to the tax rate (f N > t ). Expected revenue generally will fall (or stay constant) when 
the tax rate is high (t > 2c ) or the penalty rate is low relative to the tax rate (f N < t ).
4B. REGULATION OF TAX EXPERTS 
As we noted in Section 2A, the assumption that tax experts can render supporting opinions 
which protect their clients from some penalties for any degree of riskiness is quite strong. 1n this 
subsection we relax that assumption by introducing a fixed upper bound on the exposure for which 
supporting opinions may be rendered. We then investigate the effects of decreases in that upper 
bound, which we interpret in terms of regulation of tax experts, either through self-regulation or by 
legislation or administrative rules. This analysis permits us to consider the existence of limits on the 
riskiness of taxpayer positions for which supporting opinions can be obtained and the effects of 
shifts in that degree of riskiness, issues which in recent years have been in the forefront of debates 
concerning both the structure and level of legislative tax penalties and the proper administrative or 
ethical constraints on the legal and accounting professions. 
Assumption 11: There is an upper bound, itz. where 0 < it2 < 1 such that no supporting opinion may
be given for taxpayer exposures greater than it2. 
Proposition 5: Suppose Assumptions 1, 3-9, and 1 1  hold. Suppose also that/ 0 = 0, 2c > k ,  and 
1tz > (2c - k )12c . Then the following equilibrium types in which some taxpayers solicit supporting 
opinions are possible. 
24. See footnote 1 1  and text supra. 
fN 
0 
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Figure 4: Effects on expected revenue of constrained audits (pN = Pu} in cases 
where tax experts play a nontrivial role in the initial equilibrium. 
24 
(a) Initial (unconstrained) equilibrium types E 1, E2, and E 4. 
(b) Constrained versions of initial equilibrium types E2 and E4 in which n;:f' = 11:2. 
(c) A new equilibrium type (El l)  in which p}f = k !2c , p(j' = 0, iti* = 2c !(t + f N) and 1tf = 7t2. 
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 5. As 11:2 falls, the range of values oft and f N for which 
tax experts are used decreases. However, in cases where decreasing the upper bound on the degree 
of riskiness for which supporting opinions can be given does not eliminate the use of tax experts 
altogether, it tends to increase expected revenue. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It has long been true that tax experts have been able to protect their clients from certain kinds 
of penalties, especially those requiring a showing of fraud or willful misconduct. Recent years have 
witnessed significant legislative changes in penalties on taxpayers and tax advisors alike. Policy 
debate continues over both the appropriate level of penalties and the proper conditions under which 
taxpayers may be exculpated from the imposition of penalties. During this same period, both the 
American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants have reviewed 
their standards governing the conduct of tax practitioners. While this latter activity has not resulted, 
nor could it result, in the kind of mathematically precise upperbound considered here, it does reftect 
an effort to produce a meaningful upperbound and to increase the probability that an uncertain 
deduction woll!d be sustained on audit or through litigation.25 
Likewise, the IRS in August, 1986 proposed amendments to Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. Part 10), 
which contains regulations governing the practice of attorneys, certified public accountants, and 
enrolled agents before the Internal Revenue Agents. These proposed amendments would introduce a 
new "due diligence" requirement for practitioners in advising clients about "positions taken with 
respect to the tax treatment of all items on returns." In general, the IRS would require that 
representations in tax returns must accurately reflect facts, that positions on tax returns must 
accurately reftect law and that practitioners have an affirmative duty to assure that these obligations 
are met. These IRS proposals have proved very controversial, having generated considerable 
opposition from both the accounting and legal professions and have not been made effective. 
We have demonstrated here the interrelationships among penalty policies, audit practices and 
the ethical or other regulatory constraints on tax advisers. The presence of third party experts, who 
are able to protect taxpayers from certain types of penalties, has a systematic (if sometimes 
ambiguous) effect on the game played between taxpayers and the tax enforcement agency. 
For example, experts may serve to deflect attempts to discourage taxpayers from taking risky 
tax return positions on ambiguous issues through increases in penalties on taxpayers for whom the 
risky position is disallowed in the absence of a supporting opinion. The principal effect of increases 
in such penalties will be to increase the number of taxpayers \Vho solicit supporting opinions. 
25. See ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 (issued July 7, 1985, revising Formal Op. 314 issued April 27, 1965) and Statement
of Responsibilities in Tax Practice and the Federal Taxation Executive Committee of the AICPA in August, 1988. 
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Figure 5: Equilibria under [self-- regulation when fo = 0, k = 3, e = 5, rt2 = 8 and
F is uniform on [O, 1 ] .  Heavy solid lines indicate new constraints 
compared to the base case (Figure 2). 
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Indeed, the differential in penalties which depends upon the presence of absence of supporting 
opinions is an important component of the demand for supporting opinions. The structure of 
penalties, therefore, affects not only taxpayers' incentives to claim risky deductions but also their 
incentives to seek supporting opinions. Moreover, the existence and nature of any upperbound 
limiting the kinds of risks that allow supporting opinions to be issued by tax professionals plays a 
significant role both in tertns of potential revenues to the government and as a detertninant of 
demand for expert opinions. 
We have demonstrated here that experts play a significant role in the taxing process, a role that 
demands attention to the interrelationships between IRS audit practices, the structure of tax penalties 
and the ethical or regulatory constraints on tax practitioners. Much more work remains to be done 
theoretically, empirically and in tenns of public policy. Our work here is primarily theoretical and 
focuses on only one aspect of the role of expert third parties, but it offers a substantial beginning. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
There are 4 cases to consider. 
Case a: All prefer the deduction with no supporting opinion. Thus. for all it, we need 
PN it(t + f N )  $ t and PN it(t + f N) $ p0 it(t + f 0 )  + k .  If the first inequality holds for it =  1 it holds 
for all it. Thus we need 
The second inequality can be written as it[pN(t + fN ) -p0 (t + f 0 )] $ k .  If the bracketed term is 
negative then the inequality always holds. Otherwise it is sufficient if it holds for it =  1:  
Case b: Some take the deduction with no supporting opinion, some take it with a supporting 
opinion. Define it1 as the point of indifference; i.e.,pNit1(t + fN )  = p0it1(t + f 0 )  + k ,  or 
We need 0 < it1 < 1, or 
We also need all taxpayers to prefer taking the deduction. It suffices again to check it =  1 :  
Po (t + f o )  + k < t 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Case c: Some take the deduction with no supporting opinion, some do not take it at all. Define it1 as 
the point of indifference; i.e.,pNit1(t + fN) = t ,  or 
(6) 
We need O < it1 < ! , or 
(7) 
We also need no taxpayer to want a supporting opinion; for it $  iti.PN it(t + f N) $p0 it(t + f 0 )  + k ,  
and for it <:  iti. t $Po it(t + f o )  + k .  It suffices that both should hold at it1 : 
PN(t + fN)(t - k )  $ tpo (t + f o). (8) 
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Case d: Some take each option. Define it1 as the point of indifference between taking the deduction 
without and with a supporting opinion, and it2 as the point of indifference between the latter and not 
taking the deduction: i.e., PN 1t1(t + f N) =Po 1t1 (t + f o)  + k and Po iti(t + f o )  + k = t, or
( 9) 
iti = (t - k)/po (t +fa ). (10) 
We need O < it1 < it2 <  l , or 
(11) 
(t - k) <Po (t + f o ). (12) 
Finally, it can be shown these cases are exhaustive and mutually exclusive except for boundary 
points where the taxpayer is indifferent. Let a = PN (t + f N) and b = p0 (t + f 0 ). Then we have six
cases and four optimal choice configurations: 
.. 
choice configuration 
parameter case (a) (b) (c) (d) 
1. a < b  < t D * * * 
2. a <  t < b D * * * 
3. b < a  < t D D * * 
4. b < t  < a * D D D 
5. t < a  < b * * D * 
6. t < b  < a * * D D 
* = not possible 
D = exists for some parameter values 
Cases 1 ,  2 and 5 yield unique optimal choice configurations; (a), (a) and (c), respectively. Case 3 
yields (a) or (b) as a - b  � k and Case b yields (c) or (d) as a (t - k )  � bt. Case 4 can yield (b), (c) 
or (d), but these can easily be shown to be mutually exclusive. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 1: Since p 1 = 1  = p2, we have immediately from Definition 2 that 
1t1 = k!(f N -f o ) and 1tz = (t - k)l(t + f 0). Thus it1 < 1tz requires 
t > kfN/tifN -fo - k). 
We need only to guarantee that PN = 1 = p0 . Define h (1t1) = E (it I it $  it1) and g (1ti.1tz) = 
E (it 1 it1 < 1t < itz). Then PN = 1 requires 
(13) 
(14) 
This is easily satisfied for t large enough since it1 is independent of t .  Finally, p0 = 1 requires 
tg (1t1,1t2) <:: c .  But 
lim g (iti.itz) = lim (2 xf (x)dx![F (it2) - F (it1)] =t1xf (x)dx![l - F(it1)]
l-')oo t-')oo 1 1 
since lim 1tz = 1 .  Furthermore, g (it1 ,it2) is monotonically increasing in t .  Hence for t large enough 
I->� 
all needed constraints are met. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Average expected revenue is 
Hence 
1C * tti* 
ER = t [l - F(Jtf)] + (t +fo)f 2 xf (x)dx - cF (itz*) + (t +fN)J xf (x)dx.1tf 0 
since CJitf'ICJf N < 0, and 
since CJitf'!CJf o > 0, CJitf/CJf 0 < 0, and (t + f 0 )it2* - t = -k by the definition of ltf. 
Q.E.D. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: Since PN = 1 = p0 , it is immediate that itj" = t /(t + f N) = 1tf. To keep 
p,J = 1 we need (t + f 0 )t /(t + f N) > c ,  given that universal divinity implies Ile = itj". To keep 
p}/' = 1 we need E (1t I it ::;  t /(t + f N )) > c l(t + f N) and to keep all taxpayers types from wanting to 
take the deduction with a supporting opinion we need (f N -f o )t l(t + f N)  < k .  
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
(a) Existence of type E 1 equilibria: There are three relevant constraints for type E 1 
equilibria, l a, lb, l e  in Table I .  Given A9, 0 < p}f < 1 and p,J > 0 are implied by these. The 
proof consists of showing that the set of (t JN) pairs which satisfy constraints l a, l b  and le look
qualitatively like that illustrated in Figure 2; i.e., in (t JN) space, the boundary of constraint 1 b lies 
to the left of the boundary of constraint le, above the lower bound of constraint l a. 
Note first that constraint l a  is bounded below by f N = t + 2f 0 •  Next, let the point of 
intersection of this line with the boundary of constraint l b  be denoted by (tb J/i) and with the 
boundary of constraint l e  by (tc Jfi ). Then tb is given by 
2cf 0 + tb (tb + f 0 ) 
2c -f o - tb 
or tb = c -f 0 .  Similarly, tc is given by 
2cf o + tc(tc - k) 
------- = tc + 2fo2c - tc + k  
or tc = {c + k -f 0 + [(f 0 - c - k)2 - 4(c + k)f 0 ]112}!2. Thus straightforward algebra shows
t b > t c • It remains to show that the boundary of constraint 1 b lies to the left of the boundary of 
constraint 1 c for all t such that c < t < 2c , the latter since the boundary of constraint 1 b asymptotes 
to 2c. This follows directly. 
(b) Existence of type E 2  equilibria: We again show that the qualitative configuration of the
boundaries of constraints 2a, 2b, and 2c illustrated in Figure 2 are generic. This is trivial. The 
boundary of constraint 2a is identical to the boundary of constraint le; it has positive slope and
asymptotes to 2c + k .  The boundary of constraint 2c is a straight line with positive slope and 
nonoegative f N -intercept. Thus it must intersect the boundary of constraint 2a, say at tab . The 
boundary of constraint 2b has negative slope and goes to infinity as t approaches k from above. If it 
intersects the boundaries of constraints 2a and 2c below tab then it is redundant. Otherwise it takes 
the form shown in Figure 2, intersecting the boundary of constraint 2c at tbc where 
the = {(2c -f o ) + [(2c -f o )2 + 8cfo ll/2}/2.
3 1  
Thus a large set of values of (t .f N) yield type E 2  equilibria. In particular, for t > max {tab ,the } all
f N such that f N > (tk + 2cf 0 )/(2c - k) yield type E 2 equilibria. Clearly for many of these 
equilibria t < f N since the slope of the boundary of constraint 2c is less than 1. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof takes two steps. First we show that whenf 0 = 0 and 2k > c ,  the 
qualitative relationship of the equilibrium types illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 is generic. This allows 
us to link equilibrium types under A7 and AlO and thus make revenue comparisons. 
Step 1: 
We start with the unconstrained case-Figure 1. The proof of Proposition 3 already establishes 
the form of type E 1 equilibria. 
(a) The boundary of constraint 2b intersects the boundary of constraint 2a (= le) at the same 
point as the boundary of constraint la. The former is given by 
t(t - k )  t [2c - t + k ]= 2c - t + k  t - k 
and the latter by 
t(t - k )  
2c - t  + k t 
Both equations yield t = c + k .  
(b) The boundary of constraint 2b (= 5d) intersects the boundary of constraint 4c (= 6c) at the 
same point as the boundary of constraint 4a (= 2c). This, of course, also equals the boundary of 
constraint 6a (= 5a). The boundaries of constraints 2b and 4c, intersect at 
2ct - t(t - k) kt 
t - k  t-k 
and those of constraints 4c and 2c at 
kt tk 
t - k = 2c - k
Both equations yield t = 2c which is identical to the boundary of constraint 6a. Since k < c ,
c + k < 2c , so that constraint 2b is indeed nontrivial (see the proof of Proposition 3). 
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(c) The boundary of constraint 4c (= 6c) can easily be shown to be below the boundary of 
constraint 2b (= Sc) for all t < 2c . We wish to show it lies above the boundary of constraint 8a (= 
Sb). This requires 
kt 
-- > 2c - tt - k 
or 
t2 - 2ct + 2ck > 0.
If we try to set t2 - 2ct + 2ck = 0, it has real solutions if and only if c > 2k . To say that 
t2 - 2ct + 2ck > 0 thus means that c < 2k.
(d) Finally, we show that the boundary of constraint 8a (= Sb) intersects the boundaries of 
constraints lb (= 3a) and Sc (= la) at the same point. We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that 
the boundaries of constraints 1 b and Sc intersect at t = c ,  so it suffices to that t = c solves 
t - 2c = t. 
(e) Arguments (a) - (d) establish the genericity of Figure 2 when/ 0 = 0 and c < 2k . With 
respect to Figure 3, the only additional element is the boundary of constraint 9b (= 4d). But the 
bmh"'tdary of constraint 9b intersects that of constraint 4c whenever 
tk tk2
--
= t - k  (t - k)(2c - t  + k) · 
This occurs uniquely at t = 2c . Above t = 2c , the boundary of constraint 9b is increasing and 
asymptotes to 2c + k .  Thus Figure 3 is also generic. 
PART II 
Based on Part I, we can relate equilibrium types in the two regimes according to the following. 
Possible Equilibrium Types Before and After Audit Constraint 
unconstrained E l E 2  E 3  E4 E S  E6 E7 ES  
constrained E9, E 10 E4, E9 E9, E 10 E4 E9, E l0 E 6  E lO E S  
In the unconstrained case; equilibria E 1 ,  E 2, E 3, a.Tid E 4 in.volvc the solicitation of expert opirtlo11s. 
We analyze the revenue effects of the regime shift on these equilibria. 
a) type E 1 equilibria: 
(i) E 1 � E9: Here ER 1 S ER9 if and only if 
t(l - it:!.) s t(l  - iti) 
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where ER; = expected revenue in type Ei equilibrium and iti = itz* for equilibria of type Ei , i = 1,9. 
Since 
this condition reduces to ER 1 s ER 9 if and only if 2k <': t .  The constraint is nontrivial if and only if 
(2ck )112 < 2k < 2c . The first inequality follows from c < 2k and the latter from A9.
(ii) E 1 � E 10: Here ER 1 SER 10 if and only if t (  - iti) S t(l - it)°). Since it} = 2cfN/t(t + fN) 
and it:!.0 = 2c l(t + f N ), this reduces immediately to f N <': t ,  which always holds by constraint
la. 
b) type E2 equilibria:
(i) E 2 � E4: Here ER2 <': ER4 ifand only if 
[tE (it I itf S it  S Ttf) - c ](itf - itf) + t (1 - it}) 
Since itf = 2/(t + fN), itf = klfN , and itf = (t - k)lt = iti, this constraint reduces to 
2cf N <'= k (t + f N ), whlch always holds by constraint 2c. 
(ii) E2 � E 9: Here ER2 <':ER9 if and only if
[tE (it I itf S it  S Ttf) - c ](itf - itf) + t (1 - itf) <': t(l - itt). 
A sufficient condition for ER 2 <': ER 9 is therefore itf S iti. Since itf = (t - k )It and 
iti = 2cf N (t - k )2/t [k2(t + f N) - tf N (t - 2k )], thls condition reduces to constraint 9b, and thus 
always holds. 
c) Type E 3  equilibria:
Since ER 9 and ER 10 are both positive and ER 3 = 0 , it is immediate that ER0 > ER 3 and 
ER 10 > ER 3. 
d) Type E 4 equilibria:
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Type E 4 equilibria remain type E 4 equilibria under the regime switch so there is no revenue 
effect. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Given the hypotheses of the proposition, Figure 2 is generic and we can work from Table 1 .  
Initial equilibrium types will still occur whenever rtf S rt2. The following table gives new
constraints and the resulting redundant constraint for each initial equilibrium types that still exists 
(only type E 3  vanishes in this case). 
equilibrium type 
E I
E 2  
E4 
new constraint 
z- -f N $ t rt'lf(2c - trtz) 
-
t S kl(I - rt2) 
-
t S kl(l - rtz) 
redundant constraint 
rt:f < I : IN < t21(2c - t)
none 
none 
Initial equilibrium types E 2 and E 4 exist in modified fonn with rt:f = rtz. The following table 
gives new constraints that bind under the hypotheses of the proposition and the resulting redundant 
constraints. 
equilibrium type 
E 2  
E4 
new constraints 
rt1 = rt2: t :<: kl(! - rtz) 
pif = I: IN s t2i21c2c - tnz) 
-
-
rt:f = rt2: t :<: kl(! - rtz) 
- -
rt{ < rtz: f N > klrtz 
redundant constraints 
pif = I :  IN S t (t - k)/(2c - t + k)
rt{ < rt:f: IN > [2ct - t (t - k)]l(t - k) 
rt1* < rtz*: IN > ktl(t - k) 
Initial equilibrium types E 5 - E 7 do not involve the use of tax experts. Initial equilibrium type 
E 8 continues to exist as before. Some tedious calculations also show that Figure 5 is generic. This 
leaves two zones unaccounted for. In one a "new" equilibrium type, E I  I ,  exists. It has the fonn 
given in the proposition and exists for all (t ,/ N) such that f N > (2c - t nz)lnz, t > k ,  and
fN > t2nzl(2c - tnz). These constraints are associated respectively with rt{ < nz,pJ' = 0, and the
requirement that for all rt E (rt1,rt2) it is preferable to take the deduction with an expert opinion rather 
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than not take the deduction. 
The other "unaccounted for" zone does not include the use of tax experts. To see this, note first 
-
- -
that t7t2 < c on this range. Hence if it1 < 1tz then pJ' = 0 since tit2 < c implies tE (it I it1 < it $;  aj < c 
-
- -
whenever it1 c 1tz. Also, we have (t + f N )itz/2 < c .  Hence, if it1 < 1tz then PN = 0 by a similar 
argument. Thus no third parties are used but pJ' = 0 anyway since tit2 < c .  Since it is impossible 
for PN = 1 this is just equilibrium type 7, which we know requires/ N < (2ck - t2nz)!t"ir.z, which lies
inside the zone. 
Q.E.D. 
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